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COVERNANCE: FEMINIST THEORY, THE ISLAMIC VEIL
AND THE STRASBOURG COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE ON RELIGIOUS
DRESS-APPEARANCE RESTRICTIONS
Amina Haleem
Abstract
This paper explores how the human right of religious freedom has been conceptually and
pragmatically developed under international law within the European Court of Human Rights as
applied to veiled Muslim women. This paper analyzes the application of human rights
guarantees as established in the European Convention on Human Rights and case law
established by the European Court that has interpreted international documents to determine the
religious freedoms of veiled Muslim women in the public sphere. The analytical framework
identifies the divergence between liberal and third wave feminist approaches to the Islamic veil,
and identifies the feminist approaches to international human rights.
The European Court has staunchly upheld governmental restrictions on Islamic veiling
across Europe under Article 9 of the European Convention. This has disparately impacted
religious freedom of Muslim women and their ability to manifest religion through their dressappearance. Challenging the Court’s normative application, and discriminatory outcomes, of
Article 9 jurisprudence through postmodern and postcolonial feminist interpretations of
religious freedom may provide an opportunity to strengthen and elevate diverse female voices,
like those of veiled Muslim women, in the review of dress appearance restrictions. Challenging
Article 9 jurisprudence will help break the institutionalization of a harmful stereotype of the
Islamic veil that relegates religious women to the darkest corners of European society. Women
who have made a conscious choice to wear the Islamic veil need governmental and judicial
protection of their religious freedom and of the ability to embrace the dynamic aspects of their

gender, religion, identity, and autonomy in a secular Western society. Without this protection,
veiled women will continue to live under a restrictive form of covernance - a discriminatory
system of governance that restricts the way they manifest their religious belief by covering their
bodies in the public sphere.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
“Does the scarf- in and of itself- threaten society?”1 This simple question, posed by

Amos N. Guiora, in his article “The Threat of Religious Extremism,” is at the heart of an
ongoing and transformative European debate on the role of Islam in European secular
democracy. Islamophobia is defined as “irrational hostility, fear, or hatred of Islam, Muslims,
and Islamic culture, and active discrimination against these groups or individuals within them.”2
While Muslims of all races, genders, and age groups have been victims of Islamophobia,
noticeably, veiled Muslim women are increasingly direct targets of Islamophobic political
rhetoric and legislative measures.
A growing anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic trend is expanding across Europe.
Decolonization, labor programs, and refugee migration have led to an increasing Muslim
presence in western and northern Europe, but one of the most contentious social issues centers
around the Islamic veil. 3 It is more so an issue in these parts of Europe as opposed to Eastern
and South East Europe where “headscarves are part of the normal female dress . . . and are not at
all typical of Islamic countries alone.”4
Conservative politicians who propagate a divide between “Islam and the West” benefit
immeasurably by conflating radicals with all other Muslims citizens in Europe. This type of fear
mongering has increased since September 11, and can be highlighted by the January 2015
Charlie Hebdo attack where the French newspaper,

1

Amos N. Guiora, The Threat of Religious Extremism, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 743, 767 (2009). Guiora is a law lecturer
and co-director of the Center for Global Justice at the University of Utah.
2
Islamophobia in Europe, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, (April 2015),
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/islamophobia-europe.
3
The term “Islamic veil” is used to describe all methods of veiling and hereinafter will be used to include the hijab,
the niqab, and the burqa.
4
Peter Antes, Islam in Europe, in RELIGION IN EUROPE: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 51, 46-61 (Sean Gill, et al.
eds., 1993).
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in its raucous, vulgar and sometimes commercially driven effort to offend every
Islamic piety, including the figure of the Prophet Muhammad, became a symbol of
an aggressive French secularism that saw its truest enemy in the rise of conservative
Islam in France, which is estimated to have the largest Muslim population in
Europe.5
The attack was undoubtedly inexcusable, but Islamophobia and xenophobia have taken
center-stage in the socio-political effort to marginalize Islamic influences as “the main threat to a
so-called European identity.”6 They have also influenced the direction of international human
rights law in Europe.
European regulations on variations of the Islamic veil are a noticeable trend in France,
Belgium, Turkey, Denmark, and towns in Switzerland, Russia, Italy, and Spain.7 Arguments
supporting Islamic veil bans are centered on the importance of secular democracy to a wellfunctioning European society. However, states have been selective in enforcing secular values
when confronting Islamic cultural and religious traditions. For example, in the 1980s, French
politicians, feminists, and members of the public decried the hijab in public schools, but at the
same time, “the French government quietly permitted immigrant men to bring multiple wives
into the country.”8 Thus, the concern about the hijab’s non-Western and negative influence a
liberal and secular society falters when compared to polygamy in the same secular society. Both
aspects of non-Western culture have, in the eyes of universal liberalists, undesirable implications
on gender equality, but only the veil is more noticeably featured in the West as a distinctive
marker of female subservience.

5

Steven Erlanger & Katrin Bennhold, ‘Dangerous Moment’ for Europe, as Fear and Resentment Grow, N.Y TIMES
(Jan. 8, 2015), at A1. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/world/europe/paris-attack-reflects-adangerous-moment-for-europe.html?_r=0.
6
Islamophobia and the Next European Parliament, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (May 22, 2014),
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_islamophobia_and_the_next_european_parliament262.
7
The Islamic Veil Across Europe, THE BBC, (July 1 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13038095.
8
Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women, in CURRENT ISSUES IN LAW AND RELIGION 331, 331-47
(Rinaldo Cristofori et al., eds., 2013).
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The regulations on the Islamic veil have been the subject of increased international
litigation in recent years. The European Court of Human Rights’ (the “Strasbourg Court”)
religious dress-appearance jurisprudence has established that restrictions, and even outright bans,
on the Islamic veil in public forums do not violate the freedom of religion if they are necessary in
a democratic society and are proportionate to a legitimate state goal.9 This issue is most
prominently illustrated in the 2014 case of S.A.S. v. France where the Strasbourg Court applied a
wide margin of appreciation to a French law that prohibited concealing one’s face in public,
except under certain circumstances.10 In upholding the ban, the Court deferred to the French
goal of “living together” and promoting uninhibited interaction between individuals.11 The
Court accepted France’s argument that “the barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the
face . . . breach[es] the right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living
together easier.”12
The normative structure of European secularism indulges in discriminatory cultural and
religious assumptions about the Islamic veil. It compounds the conflict between gender equality
and religious freedom. The consequences of failing to harmonize these rights within the
European interpretation of human rights law disproportionately forces veiled Muslim women to
sacrifice an aspect of their religious identity and individual autonomy. Further, the Strasbourg
Court’s jurisprudence upholding these dress-appearance restrictions perpetuate the liberal
9

S.A.S. v. France [GC], no. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R ¶¶ 157-62 (2014). Available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145466. (The Court dismissed the argument by the
applicant, a French Muslim woman, that the law indirectly discriminated against Muslim women. The Court
reasoned that although the law clearly affected some Muslim women negatively, the law did not target the religious
element of the veil and therefore it had an objective purpose. Unfortunately, the Court’s dismissal of the law’s
indirect discriminatory effects on veiled Muslim women underlies the liberal feminist framework, which preserves
religious and cultural discrimination in favor of Western imperialism. By placing more value on the rights of others
to freely interact in society, the Court is effectively condoning France’s marginalization of Islamic practices in its
public sphere.)
10
Id. at ¶ 129, ¶ 155.
11
Id. at ¶ 142, ¶ 157.
12
Id. at ¶ 122.
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feminist presumption that the veil, and its meaning in Western society, are fundamentally
incompatible with secular democracy and modern gender equality.
Part II of this paper provides background on the Strasbourg Court and explains the
Court’s evaluation process of claims of religious discrimination. It also provides the provisions
of Article 9 of the European Convention and notes the bifurcation of religious freedom into two
categories: the freedom of conscience and the manifestation of religious belief.13
Part III identifies liberal feminism and postmodern/postcolonial feminism as competing
theories through which to understand the Islamic veil’s significance in the European public
sphere. It critiques liberal feminism’s perpetuation of the “false consciousness” theory and
victimization of veiled Muslim women in a patriarchal religion. It further identifies
postmodern/postcolonial feminism as alternative agency-based theories that denounce the liberal
feminist “othering” of Muslim women and that account for the various facets of a woman’s
identity and religious agency.
Part IV critiques European secular governance as a restrictive and discriminatory norm
that diminishes the cultural and religious autonomy of veiled Muslim women. It asserts that the
Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of secular governance as applied to dress-appearance restriction
claims inhibits Islamic veiling in the public sphere through a stereotypical and harmful
understanding of the veil’s role in shaping a Muslim woman’s religious and gender identity. The
Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence endorses a particular normative European governing structure

13

There are several relevant issues regarding contemporary religious freedom that are beyond the scope of my thesis
and will not be the subject of analysis in this paper. These issues include the impact of legal and social restrictions
within Muslim-majority non-Western countries on gender inequality, the effects of religious freedom jurisprudence
out of international tribunals on men who manifest their religious beliefs through dress-appearance like Sikh and
Jewish men, and the comparison of the European form of secularism and democracy to other Western structures.
This paper will only address the rights of, and restrictions on, Muslim women to wear Islamic veils in European
societies.
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that views Islamic veiling as an unfavorable religious practice in secular democratic society.14
Part IV will also explain that a critical shift in the theoretical analysis of the Islamic veil, from a
liberal feminist approach to a postmodern/postcolonial approach, in the context of gender
equality is necessary to achieve greater religious freedom under international law because it
allows Muslim women to embrace their identity and culture in different settings. Part V will
conclude and highlight the implications of a shift in feminist theoretical analysis of dressappearance restrictions for the future of international religious freedom law.
II.

BACKGROUND ON THE STRASBOURG COURT AND ARTICLE 9 OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION

The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention) is a regional human rights instrument that requires member states of the Council of
Europe to protect individual rights.15 It entered into force in 1953 and established the European
Court of Human Rights, based in Strasbourg, France.16 The Court has jurisdiction to hear claims
arising under the Convention against state parties.17 The Court functions to uphold the
“subsidiary” principle ensuring that sovereign states are the primary vehicle to protect human
rights under the Convention at the national level and in domestic courts.18 The European

14

See generally Carolyn Evans, The ‘Islamic Scarf’ in the European Court of Human Rights, 7 MELB. J. INT'L. L.
52, 59-60 (2006) (Evans discusses the contradictory stereotypes that the Court perpetuates of veiled Muslim women
and girls, namely that they are on one hand, oppressed victims in desperate need of liberation and protection from
religious oppression, and that they are simultaneously aggressors perpetuating fundamentalist values by
proselytizing by simply wearing the veil. In both instances, these women are somehow a threat to the liberal,
egalitarian order).
15
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
230 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
16
Id. at art. 19.
17
Id. at art. 32.
18
Jilan Kamal, Justified Interference with Religious Freedom: The European Court of Human Rights and the Need
for Mediating Doctrine Under Article 9(2), 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 669 (2008).
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Convention bifurcates religious freedom in Article 9.19 Religious freedom, in a broad sense,
encompasses specific rights including:
[t]he right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, the right to equal
protection of the law, including the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
religion, the right of persons belonging to religious minorities to profess and practice
their religion, and the right to protection from incitement to discrimination, hostility,
or violence.20
However, while freedom of conscience is absolute, the right to manifest religion is not.
This distinct categorization of rights has practical implications in the lives of religious adherents,
especially because the theoretical underpinnings of human rights have “failed to harmonize
freedom of religion . . . or to confront the consequences of this failure.”21
The Strasbourg Court has interpreted the Convention to be a “living instrument” that
decides modern social issues including but not limited to “assisted suicide, strip searching,
domestic slavery . . . adoption by homosexuals, the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in schools
and universities . . . and environmental concerns.”22 The Court has focused on fundamental civil
and political rights claims, and in the particular context of this paper, claims arising under the
freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
Article 9 of the European Convention states23
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
19

European Convention on Human Rights, art 9 at 10-11.
Peter G. Danchin, The Tangled Law and Politics of Religious Freedom, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 73, 89-90
(2012).
21
Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves, Religious Expression,
and Women's Equality Under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 397-98 (2007).
22
The ECHR in 50 Questions, COUNCIL OF EUROPE. Available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf.
23
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 9 at 10-11.
20
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the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
The Convention’s language grants individuals an absolute right to freedom of belief
under 9(1), but 9(2) curtails the individual's right to “manifest” that belief in the public sphere.
Article 9(2), also known as the limitations clause, provides the threshold test for restrictions on
the freedom to manifest a religious belief externally as an act of religious observation. Article
9(2) requires that the state legislation must be “(1) directed toward a legitimate aim; (2) carried
out pursuant to domestic law; and (3) necessary in a democratic society.”24
The third prong is also known as the democratic necessity test. According to the
Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence, the democratic necessity test splits into a balancing
examination of “whether the state action is “necessary” and whether it is “proportional” to its
stated goal.”25 First, the state must prove that the action or observation is truly a manifestation of
religious belief.26 Second, the law in question must in fact constitute an interference with the
particular manifestation.27 Finally, the Strasbourg Court’s inquiry turns to whether the state’s
interference is justified under the test of Article 9(2).28
The European Convention is a legal instrument through which to protect individual
freedoms of conscience and belief but, as will be discussed later, can also be used to legitimize
state laws that curtail those freedoms in order to meet a particular social and secular standard.
III.

FEMINIST THEORY AND THE ISLAMIC VEIL
Feminist theory began as marginalized discourse, but years of advocacy have culminated

in a “noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power,”

24

Id.
Kamal, supra note 18 at 681-82.
26
Id. at 677.
27
Id. at 678.
28
Id.
25
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something Janet Halley, Royall Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, calls governance
feminism.29 Governance feminism refers to, “feminism that seeks not only to analyze and
critique the problem, but to devise, pursue and achieve reform to address the problem in the real
world.”30 Governance feminism incorporates feminist theory in the creation of law and policy
within non-feminist structures of power.31
This section will discuss the roles of liberal and postmodern/postcolonial feminism in
relation to Islamic veil restrictions in the public sphere. Halley principally refers to governance
feminism as a tool for international policing and criminalization of forms of sexual violence, but
it also plays a role in the way the Strasbourg Court maintains a particular normative and liberal
European social order that marginalizes Islamic veiling as an unfavorable and incompatible
religious practice.
Religious and cultural practices from many faiths have clashed with Western secular
governance in the past, especially in the area of women’s rights. In 1993, the U.N. Vienna
World Conference on Human Rights focused on the process of eradicating harmful practices
against women including sexual violence and sex trafficking by “fram[ing] the conflict between
the rights of women and culture.”32 This conference significantly contributed to the debate on
international women’s rights by aiming to distinguish between “authentic” and “extremist”

29

Janet Halley et. al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex
Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 2, 340
(2006).
30
Id. at 348 (Halley’s definition here is applied to the increasing feminist involvement in shaping the text and the
enforcement of international law criminalizing against sex trafficking; however the definition of governance
feminism can also be applied broadly to other aspects of feminist advocacy that influences the norms of legal norms
and structural governance.)
31
Id. at 340 (The term is described as the “incremental but by now quite noticeable installation of feminists and
feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power.”)
32
Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 15-16 (2000) (citing the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights, art. 38, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 (1993)).
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cultural and religious values.33 Unfortunately, the Conference could not resolve the
disagreement between zealous liberal women’s rights advocates and cultural relativists who
defended exceptions to universal applications of human rights principles.34 One such issue is the
religious dress of Muslim women.
Due to the complexity of feminist theory, there is no “single global perspective through
which to criticize flawed international legal constructs and to suggest methods for change” of
gender inequality.35 This creates a division between feminists and prevents a comprehensive
understanding of the Islamic veil’s influence on female identity. Although two distinct human
rights, the freedom of conscience and the freedom to manifest belief are interconnected and carry
practical meaning for veiled Muslim women.
A. Liberal Feminism and False Consciousness
The practice of wearing the Islamic veil is viewed as a direct contradiction to liberal
feminist values. Liberal feminism is based on the fundamental principle that all persons must be
treated equally under the law, irrespective of individual and unique characteristics.36 In
particular, the emphasis was on women’s equality to men and the attempt to overcome
established sex-based discrimination against women. Cyra Akila Choudhury, assistant law
professor at Florida International University, describes the liberal feminist approach to the
Islamic veil and the idea of false consciousness, stating, “a veiled woman is by the very fact that
she wears a veil oppressed. In order to be free, the veiled woman must progress out of the veil.

33

Id. at 16.
Id.
35
R. Christopher Preston & Ronald Z. Ahrens, United Nations Convention Documents in Light of Feminist Theory,
8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4-5 (2001).
36
Id. at 7.
34
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Such reductionism imagines veiled Muslim women as being nothing more than victims of their
circumstances.”37
Under the liberal feminist theory, states must create and apply gender-neutral laws, but
this naturally assumes that “a state is a neutral actor, free from gender bias and able to enforce
the law equally to both men and women.”38 Peter Danchin explains that complete neutral
governance39 of religious freedom in a pluralistic nation-state is impossible because states are
unable to truly decipher between religious and non-theistic practices.40 Though this may be true,
the liberal feminism approach still leaves both states and courts without concrete guidance to
create and implement policies that identify particularized religious observances because it
“cannot be done in a neutral way.”41
Liberal societies that relegate religion to the private sphere diminish the importance of
engaging religion in the public sphere.42 Liberal feminists are “highly critical in their
interpretation of particular religious practices” and believe that efforts to reconcile religious
freedom and secularism will compromise significant advances of gender equality as a state
priority.43 Under this theory, the Islamic veil contradicts the essence of gender equality because
it is a marker of patriarchal control, female subordination, and sexual repression.
This sentiment is directly made clear in Phyllis Chesler’s piece, “The Burqa: Ultimate
Feminist Choice?” criticizing another feminist author, Naomi Wolf, on her perception of the role
37

Cyra Akila Choudhury, Empowerment or Estrangement?: Liberal Feminism's Visions of the "Progress" of Muslim
Women, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 153, 158-59 (2009).
38
Preston & Ahren, supra note 35, at 7.
39
Danchin, supra note 20, at 74. (States are required to be neutral “between religion and religion, and between
religion and nonreligion”).
40
Id. at 74-75 (citing Lautsi v. Italy [GC], no. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 60 (2011). Available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/resources/hudoc/lautsi_and_others_v__italy.pdf (A majority of the Grand Chamber
held that the right to religious freedom under Article 9 imposes a duty on the State of “neutrality and impartiality.”).
41
Id. at 75.
42
Choudhury, supra note 37, at 159-60 (citing Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399, 1402-05
(2003)).
43
Ellen Wiles, Headscarves, Human Rights, and Harmonious Multicultural Society: Implications of the French Ban
for Interpretations of Equality, 41 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 699, 723-24 (2007).
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the veil in modest Islamic culture.44 She identifies the veil as a marker of an unthinking, agencyless woman to be pitied by generalizing that, “[m]ost Muslim girls and women are not given a
choice about wearing the chador, burqa, abaya, niqab, jilbab, or hijab (headscarf) and those who
resist are beaten, threatened with death, arrested, caned or lashed, jailed, or honor murdered by
their own families.”45 She patronizingly overstates that, “Most Muslim girls and women are
impoverished and wear rags, not expensive Western clothing beneath their coverings.”46
Finally, Chesler laments that “being veiled and obedient does not save a Muslim girl or
woman from being incested, battered, stalked, gang-raped, or maritally raped nor does it stop her
husband from taking multiple wives and girlfriends or from frequenting brothels.”47 Chesler’s
assertion that “most Muslim girls and women are not given a choice about veiling,” succinctly
describes how liberal feminists feel about the veil, and how they believe “shrouded” Muslim
woman to be “invisible. They cease to exist. They are literally ghosts.”48 Chesler does not
differentiate between Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries, nor does she distinguish
veiled Muslim women living in the West from Muslim women living in Islamic environments.
Noticeably, the spiritual aspect of the Islamic veil is acutely brushed under the rug by a liberal
feminist understanding of Islam. It is not viewed as a belief system or a devout lifestyle, but as a
culture that is incompatible with contemporary standards of freedom and gender equality.
Limitations on a woman’s ability to manifest religious beliefs through her dressappearance “directly affects the choices . . . women may have to make about the public

44

Phyllis Chesler, The Burqa: Ultimate Feminist Choice? THE PHYLLIS CHESLER ORGANIZATION (Aug. 31, 2009).
http://www.phyllis-chesler.com/612/burqa-ultimate-feminist-choice (Chesler, professor of psychology and women's
studies at the College of Staten Island, attributes the veil, specifically the burqa, to ignorant cultural practices in
foreign countries).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
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presentation of their persons.”49 Inflexible institutional mechanisms that restrict or ban religious
dress to “protect the rights of others and in pursuit of other legitimate social goals”50 preserve
negative socially constructed meanings of the Islamic veil in European countries, which serves to
“otherize” Muslim women, demonstrating that their rights are not prioritized. These
misunderstandings are fueled by perceptions that, without exception, Islam perpetuates women’s
inequality and oppression.51
The restrictive dress policies of European states maintain a closely held expectation,
emerging from liberal feminist theory, that “Muslims, particularly women, will eventually value
the same rights and social orderings as those of their benefactors in the West.” 52 This means
suggesting, and frequently demanding, that Muslim women identify and change unfavorable
cultural practices that are products of patriarchal interpretations of religion. Muslim women who
reclaim their social power and personal autonomy are believed to have increased agency.
However, this approach is riddled with Western cultural biases, especially when the Islamic veil
is singled out as a particular “unfavorable” practice.
Muslim women who defend the hijab as compatible with liberalism are dismissed by
liberal feminists as victims of false consciousness. Liberal feminists encourage Muslim women,
especially those living in Western societies, to adopt secular Western values and they continue to
measure the “progress” of a Muslim woman’s consciousness, education, and experience.53 The
concept of false consciousness perpetuates the idea that Muslim women only believe that they

49

Bennoune, supra note 21, at 392.
Id. at 418.
51
Choudhury, supra note 37, at 153.
52
Id. at 153-54.
53
Id. at 156.
50
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are choosing to wear the Islamic veil for spiritual reasons but they are actually socially
conditioned to wear it by “immediate family, friends, and socio-religious organizations.”54
Although liberal feminism was once championed as the unifying philosophy of the
gender equality movement, it has been steadily critiqued for its “reliance on male-dominated
institutions and its narrow conception of equality.”55 The foundational argument against the
Islamic veil is rooted in the belief that the veil is “inevitably damaging for women and for the
cause of gender equality as a whole, even in societies where they are not a direct catalyst for
violence against women or an element of a fundamentalist regime.”56
B. Third Wave Feminism and Religious Agency
A competing strain of feminism, third wave feminism encompassing postmodern and
postcolonial feminist theories, critiques Western feminism as homogenized Eurocentrism that
fails to value, appreciate or justify the non-Western woman’s experience. Specifically, third
wave feminism shifts the focus on important aspects of a woman’s culture and identity in
relation to her gender.
Postcolonial feminism analyzes the “intersection of gender, nation, class, race, and
sexualities in the different contexts of women’s lives, their subjectivities, work, sexuality, and
rights.”57 It seeks to remedy the victimization of non-Western women and the residual racism
and oppression left from systemic colonization. Postcolonial feminism also accounts for the
points of view and voices of non-Western women instead of overshadowing them with a Western
woman’s authoritative say-so. Because the focus is on giving a voice to the voiceless, a
postcolonial analysis of the veil would likely lead to better identification of coercive tactics used
54

Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler, The French "Headscarves Ban": Intolerance or Necessity?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 235,
247 (2006).
55
Preston & Ahren, supra note 35, at 7-8.
56
Wiles, supra note 43, at 718-19.
57
Raj Kumar Mishra, Postcolonial feminism: Looking into within-beyond-to difference, 4 INT. J. ENGLISH LIT. 129,
129-30 (2013).
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by others to force a Muslim woman to cover, and highlight a woman’s choice to veil of her own
free will or religious conviction. The issues of choice and coercion will be discussed in section
IV of this paper. Post-colonial feminism, even if imperfectly applied, would likely lead to less
discrimination against veiled women because it actively seeks to hear their voices and
understand their experiences.
Similarly, postmodern feminism addresses the blind pressure that liberal feminists place
on Muslim women to embrace non-Western ideals, break free of patriarchal beliefs, and “reform
culture or religion in a way that comports with liberal notions of history and progress.”58
Postmodern feminism recognizes that “the headscarf is a garment that is used and valued by
some women for subjective reasons upon which it is not for others to cast judgment.”59
Postmodern feminists traditionally consider that the right to manifest religion in a contextspecific way is necessary to account for the socially constructed meanings of religious
expression and its impact on sex equality. Compared to liberal feminism, which presupposes
sexist and oppressive hierarchies ensuring that women wear the Islamic veil, postmodern
feminism creates space for veiled Muslim women to reclaim their agency through practicing and
embracing their identity in different settings. Feminist literature has demonstrated that the veil is
more than a controversial piece of cloth.
Particular verses in the Qur’an60 have been interpreted in Islamic scholarship to establish
the source of particular religious dress and to justify that the Islamic veil is a manifestation of

58

Wiles, supra note 43, at 718-19 (“False consciousness alters women’s self-perception to make them believe that
social roles, cultural traditions and religious practices are their own choice and not forced on them. The hijab is
viewed as a symbol of oppression and female inequality.”)
59
Id. at 722.
60
See also The Quran, (“Enjoin believing women to turn their eyes away from temptation and to preserve their
chastity; not to display their adornments (except such as are normally revealed); to draw their veils over their
bosoms and not to display their finery except to their husbands,” (24:31); “Prophet, enjoin your wives, your
daughters, and the wives of true believers to draw their veils close round them. That is more proper, so that they may
be recognized and not be molested” (33.59)”).
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modesty, privacy, and morality.61 Some Muslim women have expanded the veil’s role to other
aspects of their lives, including its facilitation of political statements. Nadiya Takolia, spiritual
reasoning coordinator at the University of Cambridge, states that the hijab is a purely political
tool used to empower her against the sexual objectification of modern society.62 She says, “I
firmly believe that a woman's dress should not determine how others treat, judge or respect her,”
and that any non-Muslim woman has an equal choice and opportunity to veil as well.63 Ellen
Wiles, British human rights attorney and legal scholar, explains that Islamic veiling serves as “a
constant physical reminder of that value in the course of their daily life, and an inalienable part
of their religious identity.”64 Wiles also identifies secular reasons for wearing the Islamic veil.65
Wiles directly critiques the assumption that the Islamic veil, as a cultural and religious symbol, is
incompatible with the principles of gender equality.66 She admonishes liberal feminists who
preach from a “pedestal of moral indignation.”67
Sexuality is another aspect of the veil. Naomi Wolf, author and political activist,
describes sexuality in Islam as “more conservatively directed” towards marriage, and speaks of
the benefits of the hijab in a modest society.68 She emphasizes a woman’s choice to wear the
veil as a literal and spiritual shield from “the intrusive, commodifying, basely sexualising
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Western gaze.”69 She continues to explain that “[c]hoice is everything. But Westerners should
recognise that when a woman in France or Britain chooses a veil, it is not necessarily a sign of
her repression.”70
Karima Bennoune, liberal feminist and associate professor at Rutgers School of Law,
argues that interpreting the right to manifest religion through the veil in a context-specific way is
necessary to appropriately consider the “socially constructed meaning(s) of the expression and its
impact on sex equality” in any evaluation of restrictions on religious expression through dressappearance.71 Bennoune posits that the Islamic veil, as a recognized manifestation of religious
expression under international human rights law, is rightly excluded from the European public
sphere by dress-appearance restrictions in order to protect gender equality and female autonomy
in secularly neutral societies.72
To support her position, Bennoune essentially asserts that religious freedom and the
manifestation of religious belief which are established human rights, may, in certain instances,
negatively deter international strides to achieve substantive gender equality, an equally important
human right within a secular context.73 Therefore, “[s]ome limitations are justified, but
necessitate careful, contextual scrutiny.74 While Bennoune does note that broader debate
surrounding religious-dress appearance and gender equality should not only focus on the Islamic
veil, her analysis leads one to understand that an individual or collective right of women to dress
based on spiritual and cultural convictions is necessarily overridden by social policies upholding
secular human rights imperatives for women-kind.75 Unfortunately, this approach undercuts the
69
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cultural and religious complexities of the Islamic veil and the freedom of Muslim women to act
on their religious beliefs in public life. It also fails to consider the importance of what Edith Wu,
professor at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law, calls “dress-appearance diversity” that may
be effective in achieving modern gender equality by combating dominant cultural, social or
religious norms.76
By touting the conclusion that religious devotion is counterproductive to women’s
agency,77 universalist/liberalist feminism by all accounts has turned the Muslim woman “into an
allegory for undesirable cultural difference.”78 Veiled Muslim women are completely written off
and are “[p]aradoxically portrayed both as a victim (passive) of her oppressive patriarchal
culture/religion and male kin, and as a threat (active) to Western modernity and culture of
freedoms.”79 However, other theoretical feminist approaches like postmodern and postcolonial
feminism, while not completely intersectional, have attempted to understand the Islamic veil as a
transformative concept of self and account for values of morality, modesty and piety as
important factors of a woman’s religious agency.80
Religious agency is conspicuously missing from liberal feminist thought on the Islamic
veil, and instead religious devotion is viewed as counter to ‘rational-choice-oriented strategies.’81
In fact, it is easier to wrongly generalize all veiled women’s experiences and oversimplify the
nature of the veil as something contrary to gender equality, because “fighting for the
acknowledgment of the nuances of Muslim women’s individual experiences of covering up is
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still something of a suicide mission.”82 However, postmodern and postcolonial feminism do not
make unveiling a pre-condition for women to enjoy individual and religious rights like liberal
feminism. Instead they attempt to expand the dialogue to include the most undervalued aspect of
a woman’s dress-appearance: her choice. Perhaps no Western conception of feminism
encapsulates the complexity of the Islamic veil in relation to gender equality and religious
adherence, but as a tool to strengthen religious agency, postcolonial and postmodern feminism
appear to confer a substantial deference to the rights of Muslim women to choose to veil in
Western secular society.
IV.

EUROPEAN SECULAR LIBERALISM AND RELIGIOUS DRESSAPPEARANCE RESTRICTIONS
The Strasbourg Court maintains secular liberalism as the dominant European social order

by interpreting positive freedom through a Western understanding of individual autonomy and
self-interest.83 This framework ultimately manages culture and religion by relying on “certain
substantive conceptions of both the scope of religious freedom and the nature of the public
sphere.”84 This normative structure preserves the kind of European liberalism that is so
detrimental to the choice by Muslim women to veil in Europe.
The term “religion” and its scope are not formally defined by human rights instruments,
which fail to enumerate accepted religious practices and methods of worship. This gives
European states the capability to regulate manifestations of religion like dress-appearance
because the structural concept of religious freedom relies on liberal neutrality as a substantive
political value.85 The Strasbourg Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence on religious dress-appearance
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regulations in Europe has established that statutory restrictions (couched in facially neutral
terms) on the Islamic veil in public forums do not violate the freedom of religion if it is directed
toward a legitimate aim, carried out pursuant to domestic law; and necessary in a democratic
society. The consequences of these cases, however, seem to have a disproportionate and
negative impact on Muslim women who are forced to remove their veils in the public space.
There are three important aspects of religious freedom jurisprudence on the Islamic veil
that have led to an unjustifiable imposition on the rights of Muslim women to veil in Europe.
First, religious dress-appearance restrictions, and the corresponding Strasbourg Court
jurisprudence, are missing the critical distinction between choice and force of women as a factor
of regulation schemes.86 Instead, states justify these restrictions by purporting that the Islamic
veil inhibits free democratic societies, infringes on the rights of other women, or serves as a
symbol of male patriarchy and coercion.87 Second, the wide margin of appreciation given to
states by the Strasbourg Court used to assess individual claims unsatisfactorily addresses the
socio-cultural and religious disadvantages imposed on veiled Muslim women in European
secular societies enforcing these restrictions.88 Third, religious dress-appearance restrictions,
while seemingly neutral on their face, have a disproportionate impact on Muslim women who
practice Islamic veiling in Europe because it is increasingly used to as a “powerful and
overdetermined marker of difference” to shape their individual religious identities.89
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A. The Distinction Between Choice and Force In Religious-Dress Appearance
Restrictions
Under the European Convention, states do not have discretion to determine the
legitimacy of the means used to express religious beliefs. This was the holding in Manoussakis
and Others v. Greece.90 Under this principle, states should not have discretion to determine
whether the Islamic veil constitutes a legitimate manifestation of a sincerely held religious belief.
However, states have passed laws banning the veil on the assumption that it has a proselytizing
effect and undermines secular liberalism.
In S.A.S v. France, a widely-publicized and highly controversial decision, the Strasbourg
Court heard a Muslim woman’s claim under Articles 8, 9 and 14 of the European Convention
that she was forced to remove her niqab (full face veil) in public under a 2010 law. 91 In
response to Court questioning, the applicant stated she was not forced to veil and she wore it at
various times based on religious conviction.92 Although she agreed to remove the niqab when
undergoing an identity check or in a secure facility, the Court found that the French law
prohibiting the concealment of the face in public spaces was proportionate to achieving the
legitimate state aim of “living together” (“le vivre ensemble”).93
The French Resolution, which was passed by the French parliament as Law
no. 2010-1192, asserted that the niqab was a radical practice and that France must prevent
individuals from relying on freedoms of expression, opinion or belief, which undermined the
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principles of French secular society.94 Additionally, the Court examined an explanatory
memorandum in the legislative history of Law no. 2010-1192 which stated, “the concealment of
the face in public places brings with it a symbolic and dehumanising violence,” constituting a
“public manifestation of a conspicuous denial of equality between men and women.”95
Analyzing coercion on women’s dress-appearance is a double-sided coin, especially in
the public sphere. Women are forced to remove the Islamic veil in the public sphere through
state regulations which, in turn, apparently aim to prevent the coercion of women to wear the veil
by members of their own community.96 For example, part of the rationale underlying the 2010
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in
Europe was to advocate that “member states take all necessary measures to stamp out radical
Islamism and Islamophobia, of which women are the prime victims,” especially where the
“social and cultural tradition” of the Islamic veil threatens women’s dignity and freedom.97 The
French Resolution unequivocally stated that “[n]o woman should be compelled to wear religious
apparel by her community or family. Any act of oppression, sequestration or violence
constitutes a crime that must be punished by law.”98
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The main problem is that the state carries almost no burden to show that a woman was in
fact coerced by another to veil or to show that her choice to veil somehow infringes on others
rights in society; this is particularly true when legal and social norms are manipulated to restrict
women’s choices, “especially when that choice does not have an imminently harmful impact on
society as a whole.”99 The consideration of a woman’s capacity to consent to covering her body
or face for her own moral, spiritual, or political purposes is absent from the multitude of
discussions surrounding the veil at the domestic and international level.
Even if a Muslim woman were coerced to wear the veil, France advocated for, and the
Strasbourg Court accepted, a justification for the ban based on protecting the rights and freedoms
of others to live together under certain conditions, not the right of that woman to be free from
coercion.100 Therefore, the distinction between coercion and consent was of no consequence to
the Strasbourg Court in S.A.S. Under Article 225-4-10 of Law no. 2010-1192, France
criminalized the act of forcing, by duress or threats, another person to conceal their face in
public.101 As a French goal, this would be a perfectly acceptable state objective had the law only
issued criminal penalties on those who coerced the women to veil, and not on the veiled women
themselves. Instead the law does not necessarily make clear the difference of wearing the niqab
to express and manifest a religious belief as a personal choice, and wearing the niqab under
coercion by other members of a minority community.
This aspect of the French legislation clearly demonstrates the heavy liberal feminist
influence on European misunderstandings of Islam and the endorsement of these
misunderstandings in the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence. Susanna Mancini, Professor of
Public Comparative Law at the University of Bologna Law School, writes about universal
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liberalism’s “orientalist” framework which “structure[s] the very object it speaks about and from
its capacity to articulate a convincing discourse of the other, thus establishing the identity of the
subject that characterizes the identity of the other.”102 By implying that coercion would
necessarily be a factor in a woman’s wearing of the niqab and that preventing such coercion is a
legitimate state interest in justifying the niqab ban, both France and the Strasbourg Court
condone the idea that an imagined Islamic patriarchy is fundamentally incompatible with
European secular democracy. Muslim women require the state’s protection against harmful
subjugation embodied in the veil.
Instead, postmodern and postcolonial approaches recognize the way that universal
liberalists decontextualize aspects of non-Western culture and religion, like the veil. These
theories reject the universal liberalist method of highlighting key differences between it and nonWestern society, leading to an institutional “othering” of Muslim women. This “othering” is
defined by Islam’s offensive patriarchal system where the Muslim woman holds “a masculine
subject position.”103 Mancini articulates that this liberalist process of “othering” is crucial to
maintaining its credibility when she states, “Western feminism (and the Western self, more
generally) reaches its path to autonomy through engagement in a process of differentiation with
its non-Western (Oriental) Other.”104 An agency-based theoretical approach can deconstruct the
Western liberalist assumption that veiled Muslim women, as the “other”, are passive victims of
false consciousness or are in fact coerced in a systemic patriarchal culture.105 Indeed, “[t]hey
make choices about their religious practice, their professional activity, their family and so forth,
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and they do so within the particular contexts which make choices meaningful to them and to the
community (or communities) to which they belong.”106
On the other hand, some scholars dismiss the distinction of choice and coercion as
unpersuasive in the context of a secular state. Frances Raday, law professor and a member of the
Working Group on Discrimination Against Women in Law and in Practice, writes:
For every woman in a liberal democracy who chooses the burkah there are other
women who are compelled to wear the burkah in the context of family or
community patriarchal control . . . Furthermore, globally, many millions of the
women who wear burkahs do not choose to wear them but are forced to wear
them in regimes where modesty police will impose corporal punishment for their
failure to do so. The choice of a handful of women in democratic countries to
wear the burkah is perhaps an ethnic and religious identification symbol but it is
also a symbol of identification with women’s oppression. The justified fear of
human rights protagonists that criticism of Moslem religious practices in Europe
is an instrumentalist weapon of ethnic hatred should be addressed but cannot
justify condoning practices harmful to women.107
Raday reduces the veil to a patriarchal symbol of oppression, even where Muslim women
veil freely in Western democracies.108 Their freedom to manifest and express their religious
beliefs is restricted by laws that punish them for wearing a veil viewed as a harmful practice
towards women by “human rights protagonists.”109 This attitude is a direct reflection of the
powerful belief of liberal feminists that Islamic veil is overwhelmingly a symbol of oppression
and should be banned from the public sphere to promote gender inequality.110
The false consciousness theory posits that Muslim women do not willingly choose to
wear the Islamic veil because agency simply does not exist in the form of religiously motivated
submission to a spiritual authority.111 Liberal feminist agency only exits in the form of one’s
106
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“capacity to realize one’s own interests against the weight of custom, tradition, transcendental
will, or other obstacles,” thereby locating “the political and moral autonomy of subjects in the
face of power.”112 Laws banning the Islamic veil exemplify this liberal feminist stereotype,
ultimately detracting from Muslim autonomy over their bodies, appearance, and religion. On the
other hand, postmodern feminism advocates moving past the belief that the Islamic veil is a
threatening and undesirable symbol because female experiences of expression are socioculturally relative but nonetheless subjectively meaningful.113 It is one framework the Court may
use to give credence to a Muslim woman’s religious agency by considering the context of her
personal motivations and values of morality, modesty and piety. This can be done by examining
the applicant’s capacity to consent to veil, and contextualizing the state’s interest in restricting
personal religious observance through a preemptive deterrent against Islamic values in European
society. These considerations were undervalued by the Court in Sahin and S.A.S where it
deferred, through a wide margin of appreciation, to the state’s interest in eliminating the veil as a
visual mark of Islam in secular educational and political environments.
France’s battle with, and fear of, the Islamic veil is legitimized through the Court’s onedimensional ruling in S.A.S. to what is in fact a complex clash of human rights. The ruling
brushes over the “othering” of veiled Muslim women by avoiding “confrontation with the
competing set of rights, and did not develop any comprehensive legal assessment or
methodology on the tension between women’s equality, human rights and religious freedoms to
tackle these conflicts in a systemic manner.”114
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The Court has actively avoided frank and substantive discussions on the clash between
religious freedom and women’s rights in its jurisprudence. To truly give meaning to religious
freedom, the Court must discuss the Islamic veil’s “implications on women’s human rights and
other contested considerations, such as state neutrality, equality and secularism” and “confront
all aspects involving these cases and develop a legal methodology, as well as legal tests to unveil
the true story of women’s liberties and religion.”115
B. The Strasbourg Court’s Deferential Approach to States’ Margin of Appreciation
The Strasbourg Court exercises significant deference to states’ margin of appreciation in
determining whether dress-appearance policies restricting the expression of religious beliefs is a
violation of Article 9 of the European Convention.116 The Court’s chosen approach also defers to
the biased and anti-pluralistic rationales behind those policies.
In Soile Lautsi and Others v. Italy, the Strasbourg Court’s Grand Chamber found that the
display of a crucifix in State schools fell within the state’s margin of appreciation and was not an
Article 9 violation because it did not constitute a form of indoctrination.117 Specifically, the
Court found that displaying a crucifix did not constitute a demonstration of intolerance toward
students of other religions or non-religious students, even though Christianity was the largest
religion in Italy.118 Grégor Puppinck, a member of the Committee of Experts on the Reform of
the European Court of Human Rights, elucidated the chief principle of the Lautsi case: the
requirement of a neutral approach by states toward citizens and religious freedom.119 In Lautsi,
the Court did not find that Italy’s preference to display a religious symbol – the crucifix- in
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schools infringed on the religious rights of the students because it did not involve coercion to act
or believe in a specific religious ideology.120
The Lautsi Court’s perspective on coercion from religious symbols in schools was later
revisited in Dahlab v. Switzerland, in which the Court determined that the coercive and
indoctrinating effect of the hijab (a religious symbol expressed through dress-appearance) worn
by female Muslim teachers was contrary to the principle of secularism; thus, Switzerland was
permitted to ban the garment from schools.121 In Dahlab, the Strasbourg Court concluded that a
school regulation prohibiting teachers, as representatives of the state, from wearing the hijab
while carrying out their professional duties did not constitute a violation of the right to manifest
religion where that right was outweighed by the need to “protect pupils by preserving religious
harmony” in the classroom.122 The Court addressed the underlying perceptions of the hijab and
explicitly stated:
It is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external symbol such as the
wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and religion of
very young children. The applicant’s pupils were aged between four and eight, an
age at which children wonder about many things and are also more easily
influenced than older pupils. In those circumstances, it cannot be denied outright
that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising effect,
seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in
the Koran and which . . . is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It
therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with
the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and nondiscrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their
pupils.123
The margin of appreciation doctrine as applied to religious dress-appearance restrictions
under Article 9(2) of the European Convention has been criticized as unsatisfactorily subjecting
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state actions to sufficient judicial scrutiny, which disadvantages Muslim who wear religiously
inspired clothing for its spiritual importance.124 A significant factor that contributes to the
inconsistent interpretation of Article 9(2) by the Court is its varying application of the
democratic necessity test to prove the State’s response to a pressing social need under the
contested legal restriction.125 Bennoune supports state restrictions on the Islamic veil when the
restriction’s purpose and effect is to prevent female subordination in public education.”126
However, a major weakness in this supposed justification is the fact that states are not required
by the Court to demonstrate an actual showing of female subordination. In Dahlab, the Court
granted Switzerland a wide margin of appreciation in its determination that the restriction was
necessary in a democratic society where it was proportionate to the state aims of “ensuring the
neutrality of the State primary-education system” and of “protecting the rights and freedoms of
others, public order and public safety.”127
The Court’s ready acceptance of the belief that the hijab as an Islamic symbol is
incompatible with democratic secular values is concerning in Dahlab. Danchin writes,
It is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external symbol such as the
There is no detailed discussion of the teaching on clothing or of the different
interpretations that it is given in different Muslim societies and by different
Muslim scholars. The vague, broad-brush approach to the issue by the Court
seems to rely on the popular Western view - that the Qur'an and Islam are
oppressive to women and there is no need to be more specific or to go into any
detail about this because it is a self-evident, shared understanding of Islam.128
Puppinck importantly identifies that both Dahlab and Lautsi concern the display of
religious symbols in schools and the impressionability of students in schools.129 The Court
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stated that there was no violation of the students’ external liberty or freedom of conscience by
displaying a crucifix in Lautsi because it did not project elements of indoctrination, coercion or
proselytism that forced students to act against their conscience.130 But according to the Court,
the hijab restriction in the Dahlab case (constituting an interference of individual freedom to
manifest one’s beliefs under Article 9) was in fact justified because the hijab’s proselytizing
effect in an Italian school was incompatible in a “non-confessional education system.”131
The interpretations of religious symbols in schools from these two cases are inconsistent
and have yet to be rectified by the Court. The liberalist interpretation of the hijab as a tool of
indoctrination in Dahlab, especially among young students, enforces the presumption that the
Islamic veil is incompatible with secular democracy whereas displaying a crucifix in a public
school in a majority Catholic country does not have the same coercive effect. The Court must
interpret the right to manifest religion in a context-specific way by accounting for the socially
constructed meanings of religious expression and its impact on sex equality in Europe. A
postmodern and postcolonial feminist analysis may shift the jurisprudential direction on Islamic
veil restrictions by granting more latitude to personal and individual religious convictions and
their value in a pluralistic society.
Significantly, the Court defers to a state’s margin of appreciation where religious dressappearance restrictions are enforced through laws of general applicability and are not unjustly
targeting a specific religion. A famous Article 9 case decided by the Strasbourg Court was Şahin
v. Turkey, which held that a student’s religious freedom was not violated by a university’s ban on
religious clothing on its campus.132 The Court recognized that particular deference is granted to
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states giving weight to democratic social values “[w]here questions concerning the relationship
between State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may
reasonably differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body must be given special
importance.”133
The Court invoked the margin of appreciation in Sahin because there is no “European
consensus on how to address the role of ostensible religious symbols or attire in public
schools.”134 Turkey argued, and the Court accepted, that that Turkey’s aim to uphold secularism
in the face of “fundamentalist groups . . . targeting women's dress in higher education as part of a
project to undo secularism” by prohibiting the hijab in universities was “necessary to achieve a
legitimate aim.”135 The predominantly male panel in Sahin determined that the restriction was
not considered discriminatory because it did not single out the Islamic veil but instead prohibited
all clothing that symbolized religion or political ideology.136 Even though Turkey relaxed its
hijab restrictions in 2013 for civil society workers in order to encourage conservative women to
seek public employment and education, understanding Turkey’s original motivation’s for its
hijab ban is important to realize the broader consequences for veiled Muslim women living under
a European secular governing structure.
The “hands off approach” to religious freedom used by the Court in deferring to the
states’ margin of appreciation in these cases “contradicts the necessarily counter-majoritarian
nature of human rights, particularly where protection of minorities is concerned.”137 Secular
neutrality and liberal democracy are still ill-defined concepts according to Stephanie Berry, legal
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adviser for the applicant in S.A.S.,138 who emphasizes that the wording of Article 9 distinctly
indicates a right to freedom of religion or belief, not a right to freedom from religion or belief.139
Even where the Court may consider the specific social context and history of France, the
Court must still ensure that religious minorities can exercise their religious freedom, especially
where states like France justify dress-appearance restrictions on the concept of “living together”
which is ultimately a policy of forced integration and assimilation of veiled Muslim women.140
C. Facially Neutral Dress-Appearance Restrictions and Their Disproportionate Impact
on Veiled Muslim Women’s Freedom of Religion
Sovereign states like France and Turkey maintain national cultures that are proactively
sheltered from foreign influence, including religion.141 Interestingly, the historical movement in
Europe to create secular nation-states is “premised on distinctive “Protestant” conceptions of the
autonomous individual, freedom, and religion.”142 Danchin argues that the movement to depoliticize religion and emphasize freedom of conscience in the public sphere has shaped modern
religious freedom jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.143 But the Court’s
adjudication of claims of religious freedom violations does not prominently emphasize the role
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of religion in the cultural and historical context of European secular society and Western
Christianity.144
The European approach to religious freedom is constructed within an existing legal and
political order arising out of Protestant Christian values from which states “sought to remake
[religion] through the agency of the law” rather than eliminating religion from the public
sphere.145 But the European divide between the public and private spheres restricts the ability of
a Muslim woman to veil and thus manifest her religious beliefs in the “secularly neutral” public
sphere.146 Additionally, these secularist values uphold a particular understanding of human rights
and gender equality that preserves the distinction between the freedom to manifest religion and
the freedom of conscience and religious belief.147
Unfortunately this bifurcation of spheres demonstrates that Muslim women cannot truly
practice religion freely in European society because they are subject to gender norms and cultural
expectations.148 This is made clear in European countries, which view the hijab as unwelcome
because it embodies unacceptable degradation and subordination of women in a free society.
Europe’s unique conception of secularism and its historical relationship to the values of
Western Christianity is illustrated by the French concept of laïcité (secularism). The country’s
historical political struggle against the French Catholic Church reinforces the essential French
position that the Islamic veil is incompatible with republicanism because it symbolizes religious
indoctrination and undermines the basic freedom of conscience.149 What ultimately makes the
Islamic veil incompatible with French secularism though, is the underlying principle that French
144
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democracy is an “an inherently benevolent, progressive and emancipatory institution” that
liberates citizens from the formidable social forms of oppression embodied in “civil society and
in particular in traditional identities and religions.”150 Many French feminists therefore believe
that the Islamic veil represents a denial of individual dignity, “legitimizing the oppression of
vulnerable individuals in the name of tradition, culture or religion.”151
In its S.A.S decision, the Strasbourg Court examined the legislative history of the full-face
veil ban (Law no. 2010-1192), which demonstrated a targeted objective of the French parliament
to eradicate the practice of the niqab in France.152 A French parliamentary commission
published a 2009 report criticizing the niqab as a contrary practice to Republican values, as
incompatible with secularism, and as “a symbol of a form of subservience and, by its very
existence, negated both the principle of gender equality and that of the equal dignity of human
beings.”153 The parliamentary report advocated for a niqab ban and for enacting “legislation
guaranteeing the protection of women who were victims of duress, which would strengthen the
position of public officials confronted with this phenomenon and curb such practices.”154
The Court noted an opinion issued by the the National Advisory Commission on Human
Rights (Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme – CNCDH) in 2010 which
discouraged any general or absolute laws banning the full face veil under the guise of
maintaining public order which would stigmatize Muslims and negatively affect women who
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refused to remove their veils.155 The CNCDH opinion “took the view, in particular, that the
principle of secularism alone could not serve as a basis for such a general measure, since it was
not for the State to determine whether or not a given matter fell within the realm of religion” and
“emphasized the risk of stigmatising Muslims and pointed out that a general prohibition could be
detrimental to women, in particular because those who were made to wear the full-face veil
would additionally become deprived of access to public.”156 But the Court did not find it
significant that “the impugned ban mainly affects Muslim women who wish to wear the full-face
veil” because the law was “not expressly based on the religious connotation of the clothing in
question.”157
The Conseil d’État opined that it would be “impossible to recommend a ban on the full
veil alone, as a garment representing values that were incompatible with those of the Republic, in
that such a ban would be legally weak and difficult to apply in practice” under the principles of
gender equality and personal freedom.158 However, the Conseil d’État recommended that a more
general legislation be enacted to restrict concealing the face in public based on public order
considerations.159 The legislative history demonstrates that although the law was written as an
absolute ban on any concealment of the face in public, it was a targeted effort to cease the
practice of the niqab by Muslim women in French territory as an unacceptable challenge to
gender equality and secular neutrality.
The French law criminalizing the Islamic veil as a religious symbol by default
criminalizes the manifestation of religion and has a particularly detrimental impact on Muslim
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women who choose not to conform to the ban and are thus confined to the private sphere.160
Indeed, the French principle of laïcité ultimately implies a certain moral relativism and
consequently a forced privatization of religion for veiled Muslim French nationals by the state
through coercive dress-appearance restrictions. One can coherently argue that these liberal
feminist restrictions amount to undue state infringement on a woman’s freedom of religion and
manifestation of belief. In the case of S.A.S, the universalist “liberation” of veiled Muslim
women, justified by French laïciste, “unhelpfully dramatizes the stark choice faced by Muslim
women: that between asserting their identity as women (against sexism and patriarchy) or as
Muslims (against Western stereotypes and Islamophobia).”161
Contemporary postmodern and postcolonial theories identify the personal desires,
religious beliefs, and even political statements women make by wearing the veil. These feminist
theories, with their more complex approaches to the multifaceted identities of Muslim women,
are better suited to overcome the “simple patterns of social domination that might, in the past,
have justified paternalistic intervention in the interests of individual autonomy and
emancipation.”162 Additionally, these theoretical dimensions may be more receptive to a multicultural approach in a democratic society which, if not embracing Muslim religion and culture,
will certainly tolerate the different customs of veiling, because “tolerance demands that liberal
cultures tolerate the existence of non-liberal cultures alongside their own culture.”163
The Court’s decision in S.A.S allowed the French government to segregate religious garb
from the public sphere, in effect reducing the pluralistic composition of France’s society and
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leaving the applicant’s underlying claim without remedy.164 Some states further restrict religious
freedom from the public sphere “if it collides with the basic foundations of that given society, be
that secularity, assimilation, or both.”165 The perception that Islam, especially in a women’s
rights context, is illiberal fuels arguments by liberal feminist scholars and academics that
advocate interventionist approaches and undermine Muslim women’s vision of progress within
their own communities.166
The Court’s analysis of religious dress restrictions’ proportionality to the compelling
interest of the state is critical where the evidence for undue state infringement on a woman’s
“knowing, informed, and un-coerced decision to wear her headscarf in the workplace” is strong
and not counteracted by other factors including the employer’s objectives and inherent job
requirements of the employee.167 If a woman has the ability to undercut the state’s assertion that
“wearing a headdress of this kind is a political symbol of female submission and therefore
violates the religious and political neutrality required of all civil servants,”168 she can bolster her
claim of undue infringement on manifestation of belief. In a contextual approach, the female
applicant should provide evidence of before the Court that answers the question “whether
deployment of the symbol causes, magnifies, or otherwise constitutes discrimination against
women in that particular locale.”169 But even so, as long as the Court maintains a purely
liberalist perspective, it is unlikely to accept this type of claim by a Muslim female applicant.
The liberalist approach comprises of a distinct intolerance toward certain overt practices of
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religion and considers them to be extreme or oppressive. As such, this perspective fuels the
position that gender equality can never be compatible with religious symbols like the veil. 170
V.

CONCLUSION
European secular liberalism, as a governing framework, maintains the perception that the

Islamic veil is a symbol that undermines democratic social values. It inherently contributes to
the conflict between gender equality and religious freedom within human rights law. It fuels the
liberal feminist “othering” of veiled Muslim women in Western countries and perpetuates the
theory of false consciousness. The forced choice Muslim women make between gender equality
and religious freedom is clearly insufficient to solve and implement the pluralistic rights of
women in the twenty-first century.171
The Strasbourg Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence as applied to state regulations on the
Islamic veil and as it stands now, “implies a strong possibility of over-identification with religion
at the expense of (most relevantly, but not exclusively) gender.”172 The Court does not discuss
the effects of this kind of intersectionality in analyzing religious accommodations in European
societies or even as a prevalent women’s issue. Without a critical analysis of gender and
religious identities, the Court will never achieve a comprehensive legal understanding of how
women, and especially Muslim women, practice and take ownership of their individual
identities. Without a shift away from a liberal feminist theoretical structure that perpetuates
existing stigmas, the Court will never provide appropriate remedies for institutionalized
discrimination.
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The Strasbourg Court must reconsider its approach to religious freedom jurisprudence to
truly remedy claims of religious freedom violations. The Court’s current neutral application of
abstract international principles embodied in the European Convention have proven inadequate
to remedy significant limitations on veiled Muslim women’s autonomy and identity. The
Court’s absolutist approach to liberalism in international law through the margin of appreciation
is more concerned with the sovereignty of states, procedural equality, and the maintenance of the
public and private spheres than with substantive equality for religious observers and individual
rights of citizens. At the very least, European states should be required under Article 9 to
demonstrate that women have in fact been coerced to wear the Islamic veil, or to demonstrate
that the choice to wear religious symbols has an imminently harmful impact on its democratic
society before it enforces religious dress-appearance restrictions. This approach, using third
wave postcolonial/postmodern feminist theory, would move beyond a mechanical application of
the margin of appreciation into a socio-political and cultural discussion that seeks a more just
outcome for veiled Muslim women, and all other spiritual women seeking to peacefully practice
their faith identities in the public sphere.
The difference between liberal feminism and postcolonial/postmodern feminism lies in
the assumptions about the legal system’s application of international principles to gender
equality and the Islamic veil. Liberal feminism assume that the law will achieve a neutral,
impartial, and just outcome through a rational approach to clear violations of gender bias.
However, it has been proven in many of the Strasbourg Court’s religious dress-appearance
restriction cases that the outcomes for veiled women are not in the truest sense of the word, just.
The deference given to states that use biases, stereotypes, and political goals to target the Islamic
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veil shrouded in neutrally worded statues that prohibit all religious symbols in the public sphere
has significant consequences for religious female identity in European society.
Although not completely without its own flaws, postmodern/postcolonial feminism
accepts the Islamic veil as a manifestation of religious belief and means of worship instead of
characterizing it as a one-dimensional symbol of patriarchal sexism. This school of feminism
also recognizes the religious agency of veiled Muslim women, and considers the diverse sociocultural contexts surrounding the debate over the veil.
The Strasbourg Court should recognize that its primary role is not to advance sovereign
rights over individual human rights. As long as the Court upholds state bans on the Islamic veil,
it continues to suggest that “women have only one way to exercise their rights correctly, and it
regulates them accordingly.”173 The one-dimensional operation of international law in the cases
examined in this paper overshadows the complex and personal stories of veiled women by
consistently embracing state narratives and priorities that marginalize the force of religion in its
own societies in the lives of its citizens.
Challenging the Court’s normative application, and discriminatory outcomes, of Article 9
jurisprudence may provide an opportunity to strengthen and elevate diverse female voices, like
those of veiled Muslim women, in the review of dress appearance restrictions. Challenging the
Article 9 jurisprudence will help break the institutionalization of a harmful stereotype of the
Islamic veil that relegates religious women to the corners of European society. Women who
have made a conscious choice to wear the Islamic veil need governmental and judicial protection
of their religious freedom and of the ability to embrace the dynamic aspects of their gender,
religion, identity, and autonomy in a secular Western society. Without this protection, veiled
women will continue to live under a restrictive form of covernance - a discriminatory system of
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governance that restricts the way they manifest their religious belief by covering their bodies in
the public sphere.
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